Today, more U.S. citizens live in neighborhoods governed by homeowner or neighborhood associations than in any period of American history. These neighborhood governments vary widely in their strength and scope of activities. Some associations are creations of suburban housing developers, while other associations develop from grassroots efforts by neighborhood residents. Nevertheless, presidents of both homeowner and neighborhood associations cite the preservation and improvement of property values as one of their association's main goals. Recent research has only examined the effects of homeowner associations (HOAs) on house prices, and fails to account for the endogenous relationship between property values and form of governance. In this paper, I use a form of instrumental variable regression to study the effects of homeowner and neighborhood associations on property values. I find that HOAs increase property values, while neighborhood associations exert no influence on property values.
Introduction
Over the recent past, scholars of urban politics have noticed a "quiet revolution" (Barton and Silverman 1994) in the development and evolution of micro-level governments 1 (Beito, Gordon, and Tabarrok 2002; Nelson 1999) , which have over an estimated 50 million U.S. residents living within their jurisdictions (Community Associations Institute 2003; McCabe 2005) . What effect do these neighborhood-level governments, also known as residential community associations (RCAs), 2 have on the property values within their jurisdiction?
Innovations in technology initially allowed Americans to abandon rural living and increasingly move into cities and suburbs during the 20th Century (Vogel and Harrigan 2007) . As citizens settled into communities, the nature of urban living required that local governments respond by providing basic public goods and services. However, scholars have noted that such responsibilities do not necessarily have to be addressed by local governments through city and county councils/commissions (MacCallum 1965) . Supporters of the devolution of some typical municipal powers and services to RCAs argue that through fiscal equivalency, these smaller entities are in a better position to use resources efficiently. Citizens may increase their demand to live in the successful communities, thus increasing the value of housing in that neighborhood. The purpose of this study is to understand the role RCAs play in affecting property values, and if different types of associations (neighborhood v. homeowner associations) are more successful in achieving this goal.
1 Micro-level governments refer to governing institutions with jurisdictions smaller than the city or municipal level. Some examples include special districts, advisory boards, homeowner associations (HOAs), neighborhood associations, etc. The research presented in this paper focuses on the latter-two forms of RCAs.
2 "Residential community associations" (RCAs) is a term that carries multiple meanings. The legal literature only considers HOAs as residential community associations. Much of the political science literature allows the term to also include neighborhood associations. For the purpose of this study, I use "residential community associations" (RCAs) to refer to both neighborhood and homeowner associations. These organizations have their respective differences, and when necessary, I will refer to them individually instead of using the term "residential community association" (RCA).
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Competing Theories of Municipal Government & the Rise of RCAs
Knowledge of different theories concerning the role of municipal government is essential to understanding the predominant arguments made for/against the devolution of powers to RCAs, and the subsequent rise in prominence of neighborhood and homeowner associations. Early urban theorists and economists argued that political functions like the provision of certain public goods and services could be provided by community governments with smaller jurisdications than their respective municipal government(s) (MacCallum 1965; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Tullock 1994) . Based upon classical republicanism and Hayekian logic (Hayek 1945) , community governments are in a better position to understand the unique problems facing their respective neighborhood compared to the larger municipal government. Municipal governments with large jurisdictions simply are not able to gain information about each neighborhood within their jurisdiction to respond to each neighborhood's needs. Smaller, community-wide governments can take advantage of their smaller jurisdictions to gain a greater understanding of their community's needs, and to provide public goods in the most efficient manner (Beito, Gordon, and Tabarrok 2002; Bish and Ostrom 1973; Brueckner 1982; Foldvary 1994) . If some communities provide their own public goods and services, the municipal government may have additional funds to allocate to the city's other needs (Cheung 2008) . Thus, some theorists argue that political power should devolve from the municipal government to RCAs (Liebmann 1993) .
Another premise of this argument is that citizens implicitly reveal their preferences for certain types of public goods and services by sorting themselves into communities that maximize their preferences for these goods and services (Schneider 1989a; Tiebout 1956 ). Through this marketbased sorting behavior, citizens reveal their preferences to the smaller, community governments that in turn provide the services most-appealing to constituents. Therefore, communities may compete with each other to provide services efficiently (Sjoquist 1982) in order to attract a stable and wealthy tax base. Such competition may also decrease the central city's budget, especially if these competing communities offer typical municipal services (Sjoquist 1982) . These reasons provide much of the impetus for the push to devolve service provision to RCAs from the municipalgovernment. With residential governments providing services, assuming greater fiscal responsibility, and competing for new residents, the municipal government wastes fewer resources, cuts it budget, and can spend money on other services.
The devolution of some fiscal authority to RCAs also limits the role of municipal bureaucrats in financial decisions. In the principal-agent relationship between the local government and bureaucracy (Moe 1984) , bureaucratic agencies attempt to increase their prestige and maximize their budget (Niskanen 1971 )using information asymmetries (Bendor et al. 1987; Miller and Moe 1983) .
While most studies of the interaction between a government and its bureaucracy focus on the federal level, Schneider (1989b) extends previous work to the municipal level. Giving RCAs greater control over policies and finances typically delegated to municipal governments and bureaucracies, in theory, limits the number of actors involved in the political process and thus increases efficiency.
Critics of RCAs counter that they often are undemocratic (Blakely and Snyder 1999; Damstra 2001; Low 2003; Pacione 2006) , harm civic capacity in the neighborhood (Bell 1998) , add additional taxes on residents (Dilger 1992; McKenzie 1994; Pacione 2006) , and have little or no effect on improving the efficiency of public goods provision (Langbein and Spottswood-Bright 2004; McKenzie 1994; Pacione 2006) . Many associations do not operate under the same democratic rules as their respective municipal governments, only allowing voting rights to property owners. Barton and Silverman (1994) also argue that this may lead to the undermining of civic capacity as residents are not practicing democracy in the neighborhood as it occurs at the local, state, and federal levels (Nelson 2005) .
The legal system has also viewed these associations in the same manner as private, nonprofit organizations. Therefore, associations can limit freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and even freedoms of cohabitation without any repercussions from the courts. In his seminal book, Pri- may have no effect on property values for various reasons ranging from lack of resources or because other property-specific factors/amenities affect property values to a greater degree. Uncovering the answers to these questions is important, but beyond the scope of this research due to data limitations. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to help understand if RCAs affect property values and how different types of RCAs may differ from each other in the degree to which they affect property values. In the next chapter of the dissertation, I address how specific governing characteristics may allow associations to affect property values through responses to a unique mail survey sent to neighborhood and homeowner association presidents.
Defining a "Neighborhood"
Defining what characteristics constitute a "neighborhood" and differentiating between a "neighborhood" and a "community" are difficult tasks, and present theoretical and methodological difficulties in the study of urban politics. Citizens whose neighbors live across the street, but are within the jurisdictions of different associations may consider themselves as living in the same neighborhood, 4 even though their respective governing associations may differ widely in terms of organization and resources. Scholars in public health recently addressed this issue by analyzing neighborhood effects of public health programs at the urban level (Weiss et al. 2007 ). These scholars claim that the typical definition of a neighborhood in the literature is "a geographical unit of limited size, with relative homogeneity in housing and population, as well as some level of social interaction and symbolic significance to residents" (Weiss et al. 2007 . Chaskin (1997) views defining neighborhood boundaries as "a negotiated and imperfect process," and believes that neighborhoods can be defined based upon geographical, sociological, and/or political criteria. For the purposes of this study, I define a neighborhood at the politico-geographical level, using the jurisdictional boundaries listed by a neighborhood's governing association. Previous studies on neighborhood governments also use this definition (Langbein and Spottswood-Bright 2004) . I also use the terms "neighborhood" and "community" interchangeably. (Franzese 2000; Nelson 2005; Winokur 1989b The activities that neighborhood associations typically pursue are organizing social events for residents and addressing minor concerns of its residents. Strong neighborhood associations may be able to gain enough funds from residents or from their municipal representative to provide community amenities similar to those amenities typically offered by HOAs. In general, however, neighborhood associations have substantially fewer formal powers and less ability to punish free-riders than HOAs.
Neighborhood associations often are simple sounding-boards for residents to express concerns about neighborhood problems, or they act as organizations that encourage community-building activities like block parties to increase social interaction.
The differences between the activities and effects of HOAs compared to neighborhood associations may also originate from how they initially developed and from their power structures.
HOAs formed by developers generally exert a downward flow of power, acting as the governing body and regulating the behavior of their residents. However, neighborhood associations often originate from grassroots efforts within the neighborhood amongst residents seeking to form a governing body. Therefore, there is likely an upward flow of power from the residents to the governing body in neighborhoods governed by associations initially formed by residents. The implication is that neighborhood governments that exert a downward flow of power, namely homeowner associations, are in a better position to affect property values. Sanctions for noncompliance of the neighborhood covenants ensures conformity to the covenants that are established to enhance property values.
RCAs and Property Values
Since moving is a costly activity, residents may express interest in organizing RCAs to increase property values and to protect their interests as homeowners (Boudreaux and Holcombe 2002) . One of the oft-cited goals of the association as mentioned in interviews of association board members and residents is to increase property values (Frazier 1984 (Frazier , 1989 Low 2003) , and the quality of such governance could affect property values (Fischel 2001 goal would be important to residents. Homeowners are rational actors, and they seek to increase the value of their property so that they can realize an economic profit if they sell their property.
Several scholars have attempted to examine the effect of RCAs on property values, with mixed results (Winokur 1989a) . Neighborhood governments have not been widely-studied (Dilger 1992) ,
and much of the current focus has been on the normative components of neighborhood governance.
However, there are more RCAs than municipal governments in the United States (Hawkins, Percy, and Montreal 1997) , so it seems that the effects of these associations on the lives of residents need greater empirical investigation. With increased prominence of these governments, scholars are beginning to show interest in how they operate. One unanswered question is if RCAs successfully increase the property values of their residents. Protecting and increasing property values are major goals of most RCAs, and many residents indicate in interviews that they move to neighborhoods with active associations to protect their financial investment (Low 2003) .
As mentioned, the CC&Rs are a main feature differentiating between homeowner and neighborhood associations, with the former relying more heavily on these contracts. The purpose of CC&Rs is to preserve the structure and appearance of the neighborhood as envisioned by the developer (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Low 2003) . Signing a CC&R provides a credible commitment (Hughes and Turnbull 1996a; 1996b ) by homeowners to not engage in certain activities perceived as detrimental to the neighborhood. Buyers on the housing market may seek out communities with strong CC&Rs in the belief that restrictions on neighborhood design and behaviors protect their financial investment (Low 2003) . In a study of condominium associations, Cannaday(1994) believes that conventional wisdom may suggest that the use of CC&Rs lowers housing prices since they place restrictions on the rights of homeowners on their own property. On the contrary, he
argues that the limitation of individual homeowner rights may help prevent behaviors that would 8 create negative externalities for the homeowner's neighbors. Prospective homebuyers then have greater certainty that the neighborhood will not undergo drastic changes or that they will have to suffer living next to nuisance neighbors. Bible and Hsieh (2001) present a short analysis of gated communities, finding that an entry gate (a characteristic of many neighborhoods governed by an HOA) increases the value of properties protected by the gate. Blakely and Snyder (1997) see the increase in property values from security gates as miniscule and negligible. Langbein and Spottswood-Bright (2004) examine the effects of neighborhood governments and their operations on property values. Their study attempts to resolve the debate between two competing schools of thought concerning neighborhood governments and their efficiency. The first school of thought is based upon Hayekian logic and fiscal equivalency ("pay for what you get"). Pacione (2006) argues that these RCAs are in a better position than the municipal government to provide basic services to their residents. In his view, RCAs act to reduce the cost of public services and increase efficiency, which manifests into higher property values (Dilger 1992; Foldvary 1994) . However, Langbein and Spottswood-Bright (2004) argue that double-taxation of residents seemingly negates any improvement in property values that residents of homeowner associations realize. According to them, if associations charge residents a fee for services that are also simultaneously provided by a municipal government, the residents' economic profit from house price appreciation is offset by the annual dues they pay to the homeowner association.
On the other hand, a number of scholars argue that neighborhood governments are not efficient in their provision of public goods and thus do not enhance property values. Because many residents are willing to free-ride on the efforts of the more-motivated individuals of the neighborhood, these residents are often content with allowing the board of directors to handle the problem of public good provision for the neighborhood (Langbein and Spottswood-Bright 2004) .
Therefore, monitoring problems exist (McKenzie 1994) , and the board of directors may not tax and provide services at the efficient level (Helsley and Strange 1998; , and actually negatively affect property values (Brueckner 1982; Stiglitz 2000 property values, and thus, more analysis needs to be done to obtain a more definitive answer.
The previous studies also only examine associations that levy monthly or annual fees on their residents according to policies set by the association's restrictive covenants. Most of the time, this description applies to HOAs that require residents to pay the fee. However, other levels of neighborhood governance exist beyond these homeowner associations. Voluntary neighborhood associations also exist within cities and vary in terms of their resources and powers. Therefore, to fully understand the role neighborhood governments play in affecting property values, we need to consider all types of associations and not limit analyses to associations that levy mandatory fees.
This study attempts to fill this void, and the specific hypotheses tested appear below: [ Table 2 Another limitation of the original dataset is the lack of many house-specific variables used in previous hedonic price models (Sirmans, Macpherson, and Zietz 2005) . Attempts to obtain specific housing-unit characteristics, like the number of bedrooms, type of garage, and amenities like pools and fences from the Leon County Appraiser's Office were unsuccessful, as they do not compile these data for public use. I argue that the market value of the parcel includes these components, as the market value reflects the worth of the entire parcel. Previous hedonic model studies have attempted to understand the effects of each individual component of a parcel's amenities on its market value. While it would be useful to include such control variables in the dataset as a check on previous studies, I am predominantly interested in the effects of neighborhood governments on parcel market value.
The dependent variable in this study is the log of the market value of the house at the time of report the percentage of 1s for each respective variable. I do not use all of these variables in the model, especially the untransformed variables. I include these numbers for greater clarity since the descriptive statistics of the log-transformed variables are difficult to interpret on their own.
[ Table 3 About Here]
To test the two hypotheses, I use variations of the following OLS regression model:
where i represents each individual parcel. 6
Results and Discussion
In the preliminary regression analysis, I replace the "HOA," "NA," and "Condo Assoc." variables with the "Association" variable to test the first hypothesis that parcels in any type of association have greater price appreciation than parcels not located under the jurisdiction of a neighborhood government. In the next two models, I then separate the parcels by type of association and test the above regression equation. Table 4 [ Table 4 About Here]
Across all three models, the age of the house on the parcel and its most recent appraisal value have significant positive effects on the market value of the parcel. However, I am interested in the effects of governing associations on the parcel's value. Model 1 provides initial support for my first hypothesis that any type of neighborhood governance has a significantly positive effect on property value appreciation. Since the regression model uses logarithmic transformations of the dependent variable and includes an identically-transformed lagged value for parcel market value, the coefficients can be interpreted as percent changes when multiplied by 100. Therefore, in Model 1, the coefficient suggests that parcels located in any type of neighborhood government appreciated, on average, 11.6% between 2004 and 2007. This relationship is significant at the 95% confidence level.
When the parcels are identified as being within a particular type of association, I find that homeowner associations have a significant positive effect on the parcel's market value, as depicted in Table 4 Again, this finding is significant at the 95% confidence level. The third model also shows that there were no significant differences in rates of property value appreciation in properties located in condominium associations and properties not located within the confines of a neighborhood government, when compared to neighborhood association properties.
In summary, Table 4 does provide support for my hypotheses, especially the second hypothesis that homeowner associations improve property values at a greater rate than neighborhood associations. There is support for the first hypothesis that properties in any type of neighborhood government appreciate in value faster than properties not located within neighborhood government boundaries, but the results of the table suggest that this relationship is not completely accurate.
Earlier, I wrote that Model 1 provided initial support for my first hypothesis, but it is clear that this relationship is being driven largely by the presence of homeowner associations coded in the "Association" variable. Therefore, it does not appear that governance, per se, will improve property values, unless that governance is in the form of a homeowner association. Therefore, at this point, there is little evidence in support of the first hypothesis, but strong evidence for the second hypothesis.
A potentially interesting finding is the lack of significance on the neighborhood association variable when compared to properties not located within any type of neighborhood government.
On the one hand, it would seem that neighborhood associations are in a position to increase social interaction that could compel residents to come together and work on neighborhood improvement.
These associations use block parties to build social capital and to establish feelings of neighborliness.
A well-connected neighborhood could become desirable to potential homebuyers, thus increasing the demand for housing in the neighborhood, which would lead to an increase in house prices and property values. On the other hand, most neighborhood associations are organizationally weaker than homeowner associations. They have fewer resources and legal powers; therefore, they are in a worse position to affect changes in the neighborhood conducive to improving property values.
They may simply be sounding-boards for citizens to express problems. Additionally, neighborhood associations, unlike homeowner associations, usually form after the neighborhood develops, and in response to some pressing issue within the neighborhood (e.g., crime, poor urban services, crumbling roads, graffiti, etc.). Often, the association becomes weaker or ceases to exist when a concern has been addressed.
The trend in the inception of association formation presents a potential endogeneity problem with the OLS regression analysis. There exists a possibility that the dependent variable, parcel market value, has a systematic effect on neighborhood and/or homeowner association formation. For example, a decline in property values (often caused by physical and social disorders like vandalism and violent crime) may entice residents to form a neighborhood or homeowner association.
A common way to deal with endogenous relationships is to use an instrumental variable that is strongly correlated with an endogenous independent variable, but not correlated with the dependent properties located in neighborhood associations. The results for these models are depicted in Table   5 .
[ Table 5 About Here]
The results depicted in Model 1 of Table 5 provide refutation for my original finding that homeowner associations have a positive effect on property values. After accounting for endogeneity, there initially appears to be no relationship between homeowner associations and property values.
Therefore, a property located in a homeowner association is not significantly likely to have a greater improvement in property values compared to a property located in a neighborhood association, condominium association, or a property located in a neighborhood without any form of governance.
This finding could suggest a number of different phenomena. First, HOAs may not have a significant effect on property value appreciation compared to properties not located in any type of association.
This relationship could suggest that these respective properties appreciate at similar rates, or it could suggest that most properties not located within the jurisdiction of a neighborhood government are on the urban fringe and in rural areas that are attractive to wealthier residents. Second, the finding in Model 1 could suggest that of all forms of neighborhood government, HOAs are the only type to lead to property value appreciation. Finally, the finding could suggest that there is, in fact, an endogeneity issue (which I argue later that theoretically, the HOA variable should not suffer from endogeneity due to the nature of HOA formation), and the significant pattern observed in the original OLS regression is an artifact of this endogeneity problem.
I attempt to address the three possibilities by running two additional LIML instrumental variable regression models. I first purge the sample of parcels located in neighborhood and condominium associations. The parcels remaining in the sample are properties located either in a homeowner association or in neighborhoods with no governance. This method allows me to compare appreciation rates between these two different types of properties while accounting for a potential endogenous relationship between property values and the "HOA" variable. The results are depicted in Model 2 of HOAs are able to improve property values within their jurisdiction. One factor that may be driving this interesting finding is that all types of homeowner associations are treated the same in my analysis. In the dataset, the homeowner association variable is a dummy variable. Not all homeowner associations are the same and some associations have greater resources, powers, and levels of professionalism than other associations. Therefore, it is necessary to move beyond coding a parcel as being in a homeowner association or not, and to know if properties are located in a weak or strong association. In the next chapter, I attempt to "open the box" concerning homeowner associations to see if certain characteristics allow some homeowner associations to improve property values.
While the results provide evidence that HOAs independently affect property values in a 24 positive direction, more troubling is the zero effect of neighborhood associations on property values.
This form of government is popular in central cities, and neighborhood association presidents do cite improvement in property values as a goal. While the findings in this paper suggest that these associations have no effect on property values, they may serve another purpose in the neighborhood.
Neighborhood associations can be a medium through which their board members can improve social interaction among neighbors through block parties. Additionally, improving neighborhood beauty and deterring vandalism could be aspects of the neighborhood life that neighborhood associations can improve even if they do not improve property values. 
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